Purpose. The article is aimed to show the specificity and heuristic value of the humanism of the French existentialist J.-P. Sartre, represented both in his early works, where the isolationist position prevailed, and considering his evolution to various types of collective responsibility and attempts to build a universal morality on the basis of ontological integral humanity. Theoretical basis. Taking into account the relevance of the topic of person’s searching for authentic existence in the modern world, the author analyzes the (...) concept of Sartre’s humanism, which remains poorly researched in the Ukrainian philosophical space, since most of his works of the later period remained untranslated and unknown to the Ukrainian community. That is, there is a need to consider the phenomenon of a human and his/her basic characteristics, which ultimately determine what type of humanism deserves further support and development. The author places the existentialist dimension of a human being, which is one of the most important determinants of human behavior and the ways of human self-determination of his/her existence, in the context of the general development of the humanistic tradition of modern anthropology. Originality. The article substantiates the thesis that Sartre’s position concerning humanism is conditioned by the specificity of his understanding of the authentic human existence as a constant self-transcendence, the person’s realization of the project that makes a person the creator of the values. Therefore, Sartre’s humanism can only be understood in the context of this self-construction and responsibility of a person for his/her choice. The author proved that although this concept was subsequently changed, the basic intention of the Sartre’s approach remains the same. Thus, having combined the existentialism and Marxist understanding of the historical process, Sartre nevertheless emphasizes that the primal intentionality of human existence is decisive in all subsequent actions and doings, despite the fact that real practice may demonstrate deviations and even regression concerning humanity. Having defined the universality of the human situation in the world as the presence of certain a priori restrictions, the philosopher comes to the recognition of intersubjectivity, which allows him to reach a new type of morality, which defines "integral humanity" or "full-fledged human" as its goal. Conclusions. The interpretation of humanism by early Sartre relied on the idea of a person as such, who is in constant transcendence, constantly constructing him/herself; he/she is oriented towards the future. In this case, a person is the creator of the values and their legislator in this world. At the same time, the late Sartre emphasized that since a person exists in a society where he/she is usually in a state of alienation, the question under which conditions and by what means is it possible to reproduce and realize a truly humanistic dimension is inevitable. Sartre’s position is based on the fact that there is a primal need for self-realization, to be human. (shrink)

In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse (...) behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice. (shrink)

The idea of antithetical human nature and the concept of man as a bivalent creature are heuristic to reveal the problem of human being.The traditional antinomic splitting of anthropological features into one’s own – another’s, immanent – transcendent, freedom – necessity, good – evil, happiness –misfortune, etc. acquires a specific coloring in the Ukrainian realities. Purpose is to reveal the ambivalence of the image of a person, which acquires special features in the Ukrainian realities. Methodological basis are the principles of (...) the phenomenological description of subjective experience, the means of historical and philosophical analysis, hermeneutical methods of understanding and interpretation.Discussion. These or those anthropological modes constitute the variability of the human (O.Bollnov, C.Jung, K.Jaspers, J.-P.Sartre, E.Fromm). The reasons for the mosaic nature of the human image are rooted in the existential inexhaustibility of the anthropological palette. The existence of man in the overtones of antinomies is evident in the studies of both domestic classics (V.Lypynsky, I.Franko) and modern Ukrainian philosophers (V.Malakhov, D.Sepety), and Western thinkers (V.Frankl, V.Tatarkevych, G.Hofstede). Conclusion. Controversial nature of the classical opposition of freedom – necessity turns in the Ukrainian realities into the opposition of “will” as an expressive meaningful constant and depressingly deathly “bondage”, and acquires tension of the binarism “freedom – death”. “Will” as the only state acceptable to a person, the authentically own, native way of being turns to a spectrum of modulations of the anthropological attribute of “oneself” as a native oecumene, a truly familiar and close space, opposed to the “alien” – land, people, language, custom, etc.The idea of parity of both – male and female – cores is quite adequate, since in Ukraine the Cossacks was an embodiment of perfect masculinity, “chivalrous nature”, similar to Western chivalry – with similar to chivalrous cult foundations (for example, the cult of the Mother of God and the cult of the Virgin Mary). After all, the ideology of the Cossacks demanded the convergence of the concepts of “nobleman” and “Cossack” as one who was “granted the liberties of a knightly people”.Controversial nature of the modes of life meaning, happiness disappears, losing expressive signs of confrontation and turning into a tense uniqueness of the constants of meaning of life, fate, finiteness of a person as a whole.The concept of happiness, extrapolating into the opposition of happiness /fate – disaster /sorrow (deprivation, misfortune), powerful for Ukrainian culture, is connotative with “will” (after all, “what kind of freedom is such a fate...”), on the one hand, and “underweight” – an evil fate, on the other hand. However, on the existential plane, the life-meaning ethical component of happiness loses its dramatic controversial vector: happiness with its internal semantic and moral modulations is a selfsufficient value. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Violence Is Not an Evil”Ambiguity and Violence in Simone de Beauvoir’s Early Philosophical WritingsAnn V. MurphyThe recent translation and compilation of several of Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical essays from the 1940s shed new light on Beauvoir’s understanding of the relationship between ethics and violence. While these essays predate the publication of The Second Sex (1949) and do not concern themselves with the subject of feminism per se, Beauvoir’s philosophy (...) of violence as it is outlined in both “Pyrrhus and Cineas” (1944) and “An Eye for an Eye” (1948) speaks to one of the more thoroughgoing concerns in contemporary feminist philosophy; namely, the nature of the relation between corporeal vulnerability, violence, and ethics. Together with The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), these early essays probe the difficulties in moving from an ontology in which violence appears to be inexorable to the terrain of ethical prescription. This essay urges recognition of the continuing relevance of Beauvoir’s philosophy in relation to the renaissance of interest in the theme of vulnerability in contemporary feminist theory. I argue that Beauvoir’s philosophy provides one of the most sophisticated accounts to date of the ethical problems posed by the experiential ambiguities of violence, and that her legacy in this regard is as important and redemptive as ever. More precisely, I read Beauvoir’s early conception of ambiguity as the philosophical predecessor to contemporary deconstructive accounts of corporeal vulnerability.Discourse on the body has governed the evolution of feminist philosophy. Recently, however, the nature of the body under investigation has changed. Whereas previously the critique of the nature/culture distinction dominated [End Page 29] feminist debates regarding the social construction of sex and gender, recent feminist work has consolidated around another conceptual pairing; namely, vulnerability and aggression. In reference to Beauvoir’s philosophical corpus, this recent development is interesting. Her magnum opus, The Second Sex, has attracted more attention because of its centrality in the debates over the social construction of sex and gender, a debate that has dominated feminist philosophy for the last several decades. Indeed, many laud this text for being ahead of its time with regard to the acknowledgement that “one is not born a woman,” but rather becomes one. This essay argues that Beauvoir’s early texts are similarly prescient with regard to the current preoccupation with the philosophical themes of violence and vulnerability. By tracing the development of Beauvoir’s idea of ambiguity, I argue that her conception of the body as the site of both aggression and vulnerability both anticipates and continues to productively address the problem of how one moves from a descriptive ontology to the terrain of ethics. This is a movement that Beauvoir arguably theorized more rigorously than either Maurice Merleau-Ponty or Jean-Paul Sartre, neither of whom published such sustained philosophical work on ethics in his lifetime.1I. Ambiguity in Beauvoir’s Early WorkIn The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir’s reflections on ethics come from a resolutely secular, existentialist perspective. Beauvoir—like her contemporaries in French existential phenomenology—understood human existence to be essentially marked by failure. Importantly, this failure is not vicious; rather, it is the consequence of the fact that human freedom can only ever be determined in scenes of constraint. Despite her resistance to the universal aspirations of Kant’s ethics, Beauvoir’s understanding of subjectivity as failure is consonant with the Kantian rendering of the ethical agent as a being for whom reason does not infallibly determine the will; indeed, an agent for whom reason is necessarily undone by certain inclinations and contingencies.2 For Kant, it made no sense to speak of the will unless one was referring to a being that had the capacity to act in accord with reason but did not infallibly manage to do so. Hence, ethics is an issue for us precisely to the degree that we are capable of failure. In this sense, ambiguity and failure mark the human condition and our distance from the divine. Only a being whose existence is marked by this inadequacy would ponder right and wrong, would debate the nature of ethical atrocity and recovery, and would anguish over the... (shrink)

What do the psychoanalyst and the historian have in common? This important question has stimulated a lively debate within the psychoanalytic profession in recent years, bearing as it does on the very nature of the psychoanalytic enterprise. Edwin Wallace, a clinician with training in the history and philosophy of science, brings a ranging scholarly perspective to the debate, mediating between rival perspectives and clarifying the issues at stake in the process of offering his own thoughtful conception of the historical nature (...) of psychoanalysis. For Wallace, the procedures, problems, and interpretive possibilities of psychoanalysis and history are strikingly constant and mutually illuminating. He insists, further, that the fundamentally historical nature of psychoanalysis poses no threat to its scientific dignity. In arriving at this verdict, Wallace pushes beyond his expansive treatment of the many parallels between history and psychoanalysis to a systematic consideration of the problem of causation in both disciplines. Tracing the historical background of causation in science, philosophy, history, and analysis, he offers a logical analysis of determinism and a critique of causal language in psychoanalysis while adumbrating the historical character of psychoanalytic explanation. _Historiography and Causation in Psychoanalysis_ is a thought-provoking work that cuts across disciplinary boundaries. It will cultivate the historical sensibilities of all its clinical readers, broadening and deepening the intellectual perspective they bring to the dialogue about the nature of psychoanalytic work. Timely and rewarding reading for analysts, psychiatrists, and clinical psychologists, it will be welcomed by historians and philosophers as well. (shrink)

What do the psychoanalyst and the historian have in common? This important question has stimulated a lively debate within the psychoanalytic profession in recent years, bearing as it does on the very nature of the psychoanalytic enterprise. Edwin Wallace, a clinician with training in the history and philosophy of science, brings a ranging scholarly perspective to the debate, mediating between rival perspectives and clarifying the issues at stake in the process of offering his own thoughtful conception of the historical nature (...) of psychoanalysis. For Wallace, the procedures, problems, and interpretive possibilities of psychoanalysis and history are strikingly constant and mutually illuminating. He insists, further, that the fundamentally historical nature of psychoanalysis poses no threat to its scientific dignity. In arriving at this verdict, Wallace pushes beyond his expansive treatment of the many parallels between history and psychoanalysis to a systematic consideration of the problem of causation in both disciplines. Tracing the historical background of causation in science, philosophy, history, and analysis, he offers a logical analysis of determinism and a critique of causal language in psychoanalysis while adumbrating the historical character of psychoanalytic explanation. _Historiography and Causation in Psychoanalysis_ is a thought-provoking work that cuts across disciplinary boundaries. It will cultivate the historical sensibilities of all its clinical readers, broadening and deepening the intellectual perspective they bring to the dialogue about the nature of psychoanalytic work. Timely and rewarding reading for analysts, psychiatrists, and clinical psychologists, it will be welcomed by historians and philosophers as well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Adolph Meyer’s Psychobiology in Historical Context, and Its Relationship to George Engel’s Biopsychosocial ModelEdwin R. Wallace IV (bio)Keywordspsychobiology, integrative models of psychiatry, biopsychosocial modelBefore addressing the importance of Adolf Meyer and the question of his impact on the biopsychosocial model of the psychoanalytical internist George Engel, let us tersely sketch the history of functionalism in medicine/psychiatry, and of the nineteenth/early twentieth century’s progressive abandonment of it in favor of (...) basic science reductive models of “disease,” not illness.FunctionalismWhereas Hippocratic physicians diagnosed diatheses in terms of humoral excesses or deficiencies, their primary emphasis was on the ill person. They began with careful histories of the patient’s complaints and his or her daily life course, customary activities, typical foods and beverages imbibed, and the exacerbation or relief of symptoms associated with any or all of these. They also asked questions about his physical and social environment. They carefully looked for any clinically pertinent signs, and might physically examine the patient or his excretions. When they arrived at a diagnosis (say, an excess of yellow or black bile, or of blood or phlegm), they would educate the patient about it and discuss possible approaches. Although leeching, emetics, or purgatives might be prescribed, “dietetics” was the core of the treatment. Much more than recommendations about dietary intake, this involved conversations about “lifestyle” management in general: exercise, fresh air, habit changes, and perhaps bathing in mineral waters or spas. If the patient were “melancholic” (which then included what we would now consider a variety of psychiatric disorders), he or she might be prescribed daily swimming and other forms of vigorous exercise, conversations with a philosopher, [End Page 347] attendance at theatrical comedies, or even referral to an Asklepian temple for “incubation sleep” and priestly dream interpretation. Often doctors worked closely with physical trainers, to whom they sent their patients. In short, their orientation was holistic (“mind”/”body” integration), directed first and foremost toward an individual ill person.In the second century, C.E. Galen, despite his humoral and anatomical pathologies, was similarly holistic or functionalist. He resorted to a variety of physical examinational methods while also attending to the patient’s mental/emotional status. He described one case where he was attending a woman for syncopal episodes. His examinations of her included his customary attention to the pulse. During one evening session, a servant entered and happened to mention that he had just seen the handsome Pylades dancing. Suddenly her pulse became irregular and she fainted straight away. This led Galen to consider love sickness, and perhaps not humoral or organ pathology. He tested his hypothesis during subsequent visits. Whenever another dancer or actor was mentioned, her pulse remained regular and her sensorium alert, but when Pylades was mentioned the irregular pulse and fainting recurred. Because she was married, Galen realized her insoluble conflict, and treated her accordingly.From the fall of Rome until the rise of University Medicine in the later Middle Ages, medical lore and doctoring was in monastic hands—each monastery had its clerical medic, who might also attend outsiders. They were attuned to the traditional triad of major mental disorders—mania, melancholia, and phrenitis—which they explained somatically. However, they also encountered lesser mental/emotional disorders for which they developed their own nosology. “Scrupulosity,” for example, characterized a committed monk with an unrealistic sense of sinfulness and guilt—which often drove him to self-mortification such as flagellation, hair shirts with chains underneath, and so forth, for which the remedy was kindly pastoral counseling. “Accedia” was akin to our “dysthymia,” whose sufferer was affected by sadness, lassitude, and impaired capacity to carry out the monastic routine. This was viewed as straddling the boundary between sickness and sin. Routine physical labor (“occupational therapy”) and prayers, confession, penance, and “pep talks” were prescribed.When universities with medical schools arose in the latter Middle Ages, students’ educations were mostly bookish and theoretical. Hippocratic and Galenic somatic orientations were still preeminent. (Vesalius would not publish his illustrated anatomical text until 1543.) Dietetics and purgatives, bloodletting, and so on were still favored treatments. Nevertheless, doctors gave considerable time and attention to their patients as ill... (shrink)

Ch. 1. Ėtnologii͡a puteshestviĭ -- ch. 2. Mifologii͡a puteshestviĭ -- ch. 3. Filosofii͡a puteshestviĭ -- ch. 4 Apostolʹstvo puteshestviĭ -- ch. 5. Velike geograficheskie otkrytii͡a -- ch. 6 Uslugi dli͡a puteshestvennikov -- ch. 7 Industrii͡a turizma -- ch. 8 Rekreat͡sii͡a.

Abstract.In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a (...) larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time. (shrink)

This article focuses on Max Weber’s understanding of “ethos” in “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” and the benefits afforded by this concept. The reference is not accidental as it is in this work that Weber could consistently explicate his ethical argument. The idea of ethos becomes clearer in comparison with the concept of habitus, which is actively used today in social science. It is shown that the distinction between ethos and habitus may be more productive than the (...) conflation common in modern research. The category “ethos” is compared with the value-rational action from the later typology of action in Weber’s “Economy and Society”, while habitus is associated with traditional action from the same typology. The concept of ethos is further clarified by the example of Weber’s opposition of traditionalism and ethical modern Western capitalism. By focusing on ethical issues and using character as a theoretical tool, Weber not only puts forward a convincing interpretation but lays the foundations for a specific line of analysis in social and economic science. The category of ethos in conjunction with the value-rational type of action acquires special significance due to the potential for novelty and change that is embedded in it. (shrink)

Purpose. The article highlights the demand for critical thinking in everyday life at the present stage of development of globalized culture and emphasizes the role of philosophy as a source of rationality. Philosophizing, which is determined by the psychosociocultural matrix, sets the toposes, vocabulary and rhythms of meaning making, their preservation and transformation. The purpose of the article is to concretize the practices of socio-cultural communication, primarily through the social institute of education, where individuals interact with the psychosociocultural matrix of (...) philosophizing, which mediate the general and individual level in philosophical culture. Theoretical basis of the study are cultural anthropology and phenomenological methods. Originality of the study: based on the philosophy of intersubjectivity, we actualized the rational grounds for formation of adequate judgments in modern culture at the level of everyday life. This justifies the inevitability of the spread of various forms and types of philosophical education, philosophical thinking, ideas and values developed in philosophical communities beyond the narrow circle of professional philosophers. This implies the systemic involvement of philosophers as professionals of meaning-making in solving problems in various non-academic fields – politics, economics, law, etc. The formation of skills of philosophical critical thinking in the process of preparing young people for active civil life is no less important aspect of this. Conclusions lead to an understanding of the existential importance of philosophy and philosophizing and the need for organized forms of knowledge transfer such as the Faculty of Philosophy of the Classical University. There is a mutual interest and interaction of the general culture of society and philosophy as a special kind of culture. Because philosophy actively configures other forms of culture, contributes to the creation of sociocultural identities precisely because of its ability to conceptually reproduce the core of the psychosociocultural matrix that underlies the existence of all these different forms within one society. The sociocultural macro level of philosophical spiritual practices is formed by the psychosociocultural matrix of the philosophical tradition, which retains its longevity from the emergence of philosophy and goes through its history, demonstrating the features of the national reception of philosophy as a national-specific embodiment of sociocultural macro level of the psychosociocultural matrix. (shrink)

History, as a science, has been developing in the context of a concrete epoch of scientific paradigms and types of scientific rationality. The period of constitutionalization of social and humanitarian knowledge and history refers to the middle of the 20th century, to the epoch of a triumphal approach of positivism. The formation of a ‘classical‘ historical science was connected with the fact, that history was not considered to be an art any more. It was proclaimed, that history should be based (...) on natural sciences, dealing with real facts. The review of a ‘classical‘ scientific paradigm of history was stated in the 19th-20th centuries and it was connected with the confirmation of a principal difference between social, humanitarian and scientific knowledge. The discussion of the method and the language of science took the central place. Nonclassical paradigm of social and humanitarian science began to form. At this period, it develops the concept of ‘humanitarian story‘. At the end of the 20th century, the historical science entered postclassical period. This circumstance was accompanied by new methodological approaches with the basis on social and philosophical discourse. Integrative paradigm in history, which is based on the principle of additionality, has been forming. Within this paradigm, history becomes stereoscopic acquiring the character of ‘social and humanitarian‘ history. (shrink)

Издание адресовано специалистам в сфере философии и эстетики.

In a previous issue of Zygon (Carvalho 2007), I explored the role of scientists—especially those engaging the science-religion dialogue—within the arena of global equity health, world poverty, and human rights. I contended that experimental biologists, who might have reduced agency because of their professional workload or lack of individual resources, can still unite into collective forces with other scientists as well as human rights organizations, medical doctors, and political and civic leaders to foster progressive change in our world. In this (...) article, I present some recent findings from research on three emerging viruses—HIV, dengue, and rotavirus—to explore the factors that lead to the geographical expansion of these viruses and the increase in frequency of the infectious diseases they cause. I show how these viruses are generating problems for geopolitical stability, human rights, and equity health care for developing nations that are already experiencing a growing poverty crisis. I suggest some avenues of future research for the scientific community for the movement toward resolution of these problems and indicate where the science-religion field can be of additional aid. (shrink)

In modern times, during the period of the bourgeois revolutions, bourgeois concepts of the human being played a positive and often progressive revolutionary role in the struggle against the religious and feudal world-view, since the bourgeois sociopolitical, sociological, and philosophical theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contained some elements of scientific validity, objective truth. It is precisely these factors that later became part of the Marxist-Leninist theory of society.